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\VAR POWER OF THE Pltli;SlDE~T-SU'1'L\IlY
MENT-IlABE,\S CORPUS.

D!Pm~ox-

Tm: Con,titution of the Unit<>d States c,.tahlish<>" a novF.r:,""'rr,.,.,
and not a confedenwy Ol' com part m<>r,•ly. This is obviou~ from the
fac-ts that it institute,1 all the ('ssential:1 of governmrntal power: a lrcril<lnture, an t•x,•ruth,•, anrl a jwliciary; :ind that these pow,•rs rt• indt>pcndent ot; and superior to, the ~••v1•111l sht1• legi~l,riw, exe1·11tin•,
aud jmli<·ial pow,•1·:1; flO that we hnve an i111lr1l('n<lr11t f!Clf-c,i~t\'nt
governnwnt
It 111:lltCN nol that it i,1 co11,titutionally limited in it,
purpo5el, it i;i, within its constitutional sphl'r,• of a,·tion, as p1'rfi•,•t a
HOVPreignty as any govcrnmP11t on th1! fa<'e of' the earth; for, '' thi,;;
constitution, ancl all law!'\ of the Unill'<l Stat,•~, whi!'h i-ltall l><i rn:11\,•
in pursuan(·e therl'of, arnl all tre:llit•s made, or whi,,h shall b<> m:11\e,
under the authority of the UnitNl Statc!!, shall he th<' supr<'mc l:tw of
tlw lan<l ; aml the jml~es in Pvcry state shall lk• 1>0111111 thcr<!h_v, any thing in thn constitution or laws of any state to ti,(• contr:u·) notwithstanding;" an,1, "the judicial power !<hall cxtc1ul to all casl's in
law and l'<tnity, arising muler this Con~titution, the hws of the ( 111ted
Slat!'.~, arnl trcati,•s made or whi1·h ahall he made 11111\(•r their authority;" an<l, "tlw senators and rcpre:;cntalivc.s lll'fiwe-mentiom•,1,
and the m,•mheNI of thr. ~l'\l'ral slate lcgi~latures, :mcl all exe,·ntiYC
and judil'ial otlker:-1, b,ith of the United States am\ of the s1'H•r:1l
~tatt•~, 11lmll he bomul hy o:ith ot· alfirmation to i-uppol'l. this Constitution."
\\'e ha\e, then, a National Govcmment comprising a }pgi,..l:11tm•,
inv(•ste<l with certai11 i-pecific<l law-mnking power.a; an t•~ecutin•, 1u
S<'C that the law., an• faithfully exel'ntl'cl; and aju,liciary to mai11t:1in
nil the legitimate powers of the gov<'rnment intt1c1.

2

.,

I

And in its territorial juris<liction, this government is co-exteni-ive
with the thirty-four states of the Union, and all other territory thereunto belonging. And it wn.q e;.tablished in perpetuity; all its powc,rs
wercgieen, gl'<wtrll, and com·ryr<l forewr, ilave so far a.'I they may, from
time to time, Le amended in the wny prescribeJ in the Constitution.
Coni,.titutionally, then, this go\'crnment is 1ierpetual. It has a right
to live in the plt>nitude of iH power, and the integrity of it,; territorial
SO\'Crdgnty. Aud this ri~ht of life an<l perpetuity i:; neces;;arily n
primary and fundamental constitutional principle-paramount to
eve1·vthing else. Every ilperific provision of the Constitution is as
obviously snlxmlinate to it a,, if a clnu~e to that eflcc·t were J)lainly
written down, for the continued life of the go,ernmeut is the indispon!lable basis upon which the entire Con!ltitution rests.
Ai;8uming, thc11, the controlling principle of the Constitution to he,
that the government and the Constitution itself .~!,all live, it i~ !:elfe\'i(lent, that thi:,\ same controlling principle earri1•s with it all the
needful pow1•r to protect :md defernl the government in all its political ancl territorial ROYerei~nty; iio that tl11•re is so111f"l1•ltC1·e in tho go1·ernmcnt a con~titutional power to r,..,ist and i:-uppri•s.~ a rebellion,
limited only by the neceA,it) of the c:L,c : power unlimited to n,;t• :my
and all mean:-1 necessary or 1•xpcdicnt to supprCR~ it; power to put
everything out. of the way that in 11ny manner, or in :my deg1·,·c, 1•11dungers tl,e life of the go1·ern111cnl.
\\'c i<ay thiq principle flow:-1 naturally from the right of the go,ernmcnt lo live; anti we may go n step farther, an(l lr:11·(• it to a i<till
deeper ~ourcc in the con~t,it11tional fu1mtui11: to 1hc conslitutionul
fact that we ha\'C a govcrmnrnt.
without thi" p1·i1wiple, it. c:111not be said that the govcrnnll'nl h"-.~ really a right to tin\; without it,
any portion of the p1..'0ple could destroy tlic go1·cmnwnt at will; and
without the right to live, what we have hecn in the habit of calling :1
government, i>1 really no govrmment at all. ff we have a rightful
government, that government has a right to Ii,"; if it bas a right to
live, it bas a right to defrn<l itself against rebellion ; and if it ha" a
right to defend it~elf, it ha!! a right to use all nceill'ul mrans for that
pnrpo~e. Ifit has 11ot the right thu~ to 1h•fend ilsl'II~ the rebel;; haw
the right to de,troy it; for it <•imnot ht• wrong to dt•stroy it, and nlso
wrong to dcfcncl it. I cannot romprPhrncl the B1wh:ma11 doctrirw,
that the rebels ham not the right to destroy the gowrnmcnt, and that
tho ~overnment h11s not the right to re,-i:.t tlwm. Tt makes the Constitution ajnmblc. It makeH it mean nritlwr one thin:,!: nor the othrr,
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and puts sovereignty nowhere. Rejecting this mysterious doctrine,
therefore, we must admit, either the unlimited right of the government to defend it~eir, ot· the right of the South to l,reuk up the government. There is no miJdle ground.
Thiti l,ricf deduction of constitutional pl'inciples, conclusive in itself
as it seems to be, is specifically endor:5ed and confirmed by this clause
of the Constitution:
" Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following o:ith or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm),
that I will faithfully execute the oliice of President of the United
t·Hatcs, and will, to the best of my ability, presen,e, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.''
This cl,wse commands the Constitution to be preserved, protected,
and defendeu, not conditionally, not in any particular manner, not by
any limited means, and uot in subordination to the dicta of judges or
anybody else; buG to the full ext.ent of the Presideru's ahility. This
language sounds very much as if the first object of the Constitution is
to preserve and perpctnatc itself. Paramount to everything else, it
shall be preserved, protected, ancl defended. Such is the palpable
import of the language. Now, to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution, it is indispensable that this rebellion shall bo suppressed;
so that this clause plainly mid unequivocally requires and commands
that the 1·ebellion shall be put down by any efficient and necessary
means whatever. Aud it constitutes and appoints the Prcsiucnt the
chief agent of the nation to do this work. It swears him to do it
t.o the best of his ability, while it does not require any other man to
be so s·vorn. Other officers arc sworn simply to support the Constitution-he is swom to r1rese1·ve, p1·otect, and defend it. To support the
Constitution is to uphold it by our ordinary influence and not oppose
it ; to preserve, protect, and defend it to the best of one's ability, is to
seek out its enemies who make war upon it, and their aids and comforters, and put them down.
Constitutionally appointed commander-in chief, fo1· this purpose,
too, the President is the embodiment of the unlimited national sovereignty for the active work of pt·cscrving, protecting, and defending the
Constitution ; in other words, fol· suppressing rebellion. \Vbatever
the nation !ms a right to do in this behalf, he is the lawful agent to
do, with all the material means placed at his command uy Congress. Therefore, the Constitution is imperative that he shall suppress
this rebellion by any and all needful measures, to the best of hia
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ahilit,y. Ifo i,; not only the rommandcr-in-cbicf of the army in the
field and tlic na, y on the waters, but the special conservator of the
Constitutiun in all respects, with jurisdiction co-extensive with the
whole Union. His power in this behalf reaches l\Iaine aml Minne,ot:1, as well as Virginia and Carolina.
Tell me now, ye croakers for "the Constitution as it is,'' why it
is that the President may lawfully shoot down our own citizens in
rebel armies, or imprison them, or destroy town,~ antl cities and other
property, "without due process of Jaw," in tho face of the plain
constitutional prorision, for which you clamor so long a1td so loudly,
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of Jaw." It is because the Constitution is not a sclfdcstroyi.ng instrument ; because no part of it was designed to aid
traitors in the unl10ly work of destroying the whole; because there is
nothing in it calculated to hinder or ob.•truct the work of maintaining it as the supreme law of the land; because that, and all kindred
pnwisious are suhordinalc lo the great fund:i.meutal principle of the
right of tlae governme11t to live and defend itself against all perils;
because this principle obviously implies that every specific provii'ion of
the Constitution shall be construed consistently with the amplest right
of the government to supp1-css rebellion by all nee<lful means; and because the government, having the right to li\:c, has the correlative
right lo use sufficient means to preserve its own li!i-, predse!y as an
indiYidual has the right to defend his life by any ncccs.~ary means,
cycn to taking the life of an ai=;.•ailant.
If all tl1is be sound constitutional law, it followi-, necessarily, that,
in the execution of the great trust that is upon him, with the solemn
oath upon I.tis soul, that he will preserve, prote<·t, an,l defend the
Constitution to the best of his ability, the President not only has a
con~titutional right, but it is his inexorable duty to suppress by sufficiently summary means, anything aml everything, anywhere and
cvc'rywhere, wit,hin tl1e Union, which, directly or iuclircctly, adds
strength to tlie rebellion. T ell me not that there is no rebellion in
the loyal states. If any man in Pennsylvania or l\lassachusctts is
guilty of ,lJly act which tends to aid the rebel arms, or to obstrnct or
i111pc,lc the }'resident .in his work of crnshing out tl10 rebellion, that
man is a part arn:l parcel of the rebellion, as much so as is the soldic1·
who carries a. rebel musket in the field; and it is as clearly the President's duty to suppress l1im as it is to suppress those in arms.
But the courts in the loyal states arc open, it is urged, and ti.ere-
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fore, why not do all this through them ? Because he cannot so surely
do it thus. The Constitution is imperative that lie shall suppress such
men; and there is nothing in the Constitution that permits him to
evade it by leaving it to the hauds of another department of the government, which is indepcrnlent ofbim. And, besides, the courts cannot do it efficiently. \Yhen the traitors of the loyal state of l\Iaryland
were concocting their grand scheme to hurl the organized power ot
that state against the government, probably not a man of them was
known to be guilty of any act for which he could even have been
arrested by civil proce$S. And whatever their offences against the
laws might have been, and whatever the fidelity of the courts in that
jurisdiction, the process of civil l:tw would have been far too slow to
prevent the con,;ummation of the gigantic treason which would have
added another state to the rebellion. And yet these men were
duing more to aid the rebel cause than ten thou~tnd armed men in
the field could do. Courts could not have suppressed that uuholy
work, but the summary imprisonment of those few men saved the
~taie of Maryland to the Union cause. And so in most other cases
of di.~loyal practices in the loyal states. Adroit t.rnitors, in loyal
commcmities, ean render more aitl to the rebellion, without rendering
themselves liable to any civil law, than ten time., their mnnlier in the
rebel army. That aid is none the less valuable to the enemy, or less
uangerous to the government, for not being violations of statute laws.
Statute books, and courts, and juries, i:mmot savo the republic. The
rebellion is one iudivisible whole, comprising all the rebels in the land,
Nol'th ancl South; and the President is charged with the duty of suppressing all oj it. And if he is to do it, he must do it by military
power-he must do it all by military power, for he cannot contl'Ol
any other power.
Assuming, then, that the President has the eonstitut.iona] right to
use any needful means to suppress rebellion, aud, to this end, to use
the like means to suppress everything that aids it, it must be confessed, that here we stand at the threshold of despotism. Here is
the boundary line of our constitutional government, with a not very
distinct line of demarcation between it aml despotic power. I think
I Lave made it plain that 1wces.sit!J is the only line. The President
may do, he mu.st do, whatevct· is necessary to suppress the rebellion,
and preserve the life of the government. But who is the judge of the
necessity of any particular act 1 If the President is the final judge,
there is virtually no limitation to his power in the premises, and we
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make him a despot. Uudouutedly he must judge in the first instance
-there is no altcrnative--just m; a man whose life is assailed, must
jurlgc immediately what degree of force is neccs&lry to repel
the attack and protect liis own life. But it stands the President
in h,md to judge wisely, jmt as it does the individual. The man
who kills hi~ assaibnt unnecessaril!J, will not be held guiltless by a court
anti jury, who arc tl1e fiunl judges of the tranR.'tction. Exactly so
with the President. His government is assailed, and its life imper~
illetl by armed and unarmed traitors. The Constitution empowers
him to do cvcrythiug that is necessary to ~upprcss these traitors, all of
tl1cm, to the end that the life of the government may be saved-just
as the law empowers an individual to do everything necessary to supprc88 an a.<s:,ssin to ~ani his own life. llut beyond this necessity, tho
President hit-8 not an iota of powct· more than any other man. While
he may lawfully shoot down armed and resisting rebels, because they
cauuot Le otherwise supprcs.sed, to take the lives of unarmed rebels in
the North, or of prisoners taken in arm::;, woul<l be mur<ler, because
their further ai,l to the rebellion can be ~uppressed by imprisonment.
To take tbei1· lives i;;, therefore, not necessary, and not constitutional.
And while he may lawfully suppress disloyal practices in the North,
by imprisoning their authors, because 8uch is the mildest efficient
means to that end, and therefore necessary to the suppression of the
rebellion, the imprisonment of any other persons would be unconstitutional and false, and the President and every other person engaged
in it w.oukl be personally foible in law for tl1e same. Such is tho
conHtitutional theory upon w!iich we are authorized to make war against
rebellion.
The President and his subordinates are, therefore, under a delicate
and terrible responsibility. \V'bilc the Constitution requires him to
do anything and everything necessary to suppress all men who, in any
manner, or in any degree aid the rebellion, tho courts will hold them
accountable for any acts beyond this; and Congress cannot relieve them
from this responsibility. To do so would be to authorize the violation
of the Constitution, and it is scarcely necessary to say that such an
act would be null and void. Inasmuch as the President has comtitutional power to do all that is necessaiy to suppress rebellion, he needs
no protection fh>m Congress for the exercise of this power; and as
there is no 1iowcr anywhere in the government to go beyond this, I
think it is self-evident that Congress cannot grant any power iu the
premises ; and if it cannot do this, it cannot relieve the President or
anybody else from the legal consequences of a usurpation.
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Now, if I have succeeded in demonstrating that the Constitution
empowers the President to imprison persons by military power, to
suppress disloyal and dangerous practices, I think it clearly follow?,
as a concomitant to this power, that he may suspend the privilege of
the writ of habea.~ corpus, because the writ of habeas corpus is inconsistent with that kind of imprisonment. For instance, in the case or
those ~faryland pri~oners to whom. I have alluded ; they were arrested
and imprisoned by military authority, under the clearest neccs.sity to
the public safety. Suppose they Jiad been brought immediately before
a judge on a writ of habeas corpus. The judge would have inquired
simply into the legality of the imprisonment. If legal, they would
have been remanded to prison ; if not lcg:11, they would have been
discharged. The civil courts are, as I have said, independent of the
President. They have no jurisdiction of military affairs, nothing to
do with the President's work of suppressing rebellion. Their province is to administer the laws as they find them on the statute-hooks,
and nothing else; so that with those men before Judge Taney, or any
other judge, on a writ of habeas corpus, without any charge of c6me
regularly entered against them according to the civil code, they would
necess.-.rily have been discharged, to pursue their work of treason, and
the President's power III the premises would have been nugatory.
This ii.dependence of the judiciary, this antagonism, if you please,
between the civil and the military authoritie.~, is what crcaws the
necessity for the s11Fpcnsion of the writ of habeas corpus at
all. Thi'3 is why the suspension was not entirely prohibited in
the Constit11tion. Its sole ol~cct is to prevent the courts from paralyzing the military arm of the government in times of public danger. If the courts were bound to take cognizaace of military necessities, and were competent to appreciate them, there would be no
need of a constitutional power to ',mspcnd the writ of habeas corpus
at all. If Judge Hall, at New Orleans, could have administered the
law of military necessity, as General Jackson found it prcsi;ing upon
him, the general would have had no occasion to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus.
All this shows the suspension of the writ to be pu1·cly a military
prerogative. It is constitutionalJy permitted, only as a military nece.~sity-i. e., "in cases of rebellion or invasion, when the public Rnfety
may require it;" and none but the military authorities can know
when the public safety does require it
The constitutional provision that " the privilege of the writ of ha-
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bea.s corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety may require it," is not a g1·ant of the
power to suspend it, as superficial statesmen seem to suppose ; but
merely a limitation of the power, which jt implies, is granted to somebody, in some other part of the Constitution. And the fact th,tt this
limitation is found in tlte article devotecl chiefly to the legislative Mpartment, does not imply that the power is in Congress; for the section in which it stands contains limitations and prohibitions cleat'ly
applying to others as well as to Congress. 'l'lte power in question
grows out of the constitutional facts that tllis is a government ; that
it has a right to perpetuate itself, and that the power is a necc.qsary
incident to the unlimited power to suppres.'I rebellion, which iF.
committcJ. to the hands of the Presillent, ns I have tried to elucidate.
It may be added, furthermore, in respect to this whole matter, that
independently of the specific constitutional charge that is upon the
President to suppress rebellion, as I lut,·c tried to set it forth, his
constitutional appointment to be ("Omm1mJer-i11-cltief of the nrniy
and navy, without 11rcscril>ing the powers of that olTice, invc~ts him
with all the usual powers of a commamler-in-chio:f, as recognized by
the usages of civilized nations. By this criterion, 1,e is the supreme
ruler in all that appertains to the conduct of a war. His primary
business is to subdue the enemy, and his di,cretion in tl,e ui-e of (I,.,
means placed in his hands to that end, is limited only by the laws of
nations, and the Constitution as hereinbeforn set forth. Jlis c•ommands in this behalf, limited as aforesaid, nre the law of the land for
the time, and :-uperccde whatever civil laws may be in c-onflit"t with
them; for war-civil wnr especially-is an nppc:il abo1·e tl,c (:ivil laws,
and not the execution of them. Thi~ being RO, it necrls no ar~11mC'nf
to prove that anything whatever, in any part of the country, tlint
tends to impede the progress of the natio,ml army in ,;11pprc"-~i11g !his
rebellion, by strengthening or rncournging the enemy, or otherwise,
directly or indireclly, may be lawfu.lly suppres~etl hy military authority.
Now, a word al\ to the clamor about <lespotiRm, anrl the danger of
the subvergion of the Constitution and the prople's lil>crties. ,var
partakes very much of the character of deRpotiBm, the b<'i;t way we
can fix it; nece..•.sarily so, in the nature of things; recognized to he
so by the laws of nations, and so accepted by our Constitution ; i:o
that it is no subversion of the Constitution for a war to be carriPd on
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in :he way that wars are always carried on, in the way that wafi1

must be carried on, if !hey arc wars at all; i. e., by power more or

less despotic. An<l, with the constitutional limit..'l.tions and responsibilities, as hereinbefore stated, I think there is not the slightest dan/JCI' that these war powers will be permanently fixed in the ordinary
arlminil'tration of the government. They aro in the President's hands
for u<e upon disloyal persons, and nobody else; they exist during the
\\'ar, and at no other time ; and for the purpose of suppressing the
rebellion, and for no other purpose. Can any man with professions
of loyalty to his government on his lips, object to this 7 Any objections to it are objections to suppressing the rebellion at all.
Say ye that these arc dangerous powers to concede to a President,
with a million or so of soldiers at his back? No, the use of tliese
potcers can, in any event, be dangerous only to the rebellion and the
rebels, for they reach not an inch beyond them. If, however, you
will have it that our liberties are just now endangered in this behalf,
the danger results not from the existence or the exercise of these powers to suppress the rebellion, but from the constitutional fact that the
President has command of tho army of the nation, and the possibility
that he may overreach these powers, and tltus rob us of our libertfo~. To a tyrant chieftain, howevcl', with an invincible army
to do his bidding, it matters not where you draw the line of bis law,
ful powers. Draw it where you will, it will not retard his advance
to the goal of his ambition. But, after all, if you must insist that
our present proverbially hone~t and patriotic Chief i\Iagistrate is bent
on the subversion of the liberties of his country, we have a certain
oecurity in the army that he commands; an army not of mercenariec:
fighting for a master and for their bread, but an army made up of
our own citizens, a part of the great constituency of the Republic,
from every nook and corneL' of the land, our sons, our brothers, and
our neighbors, reprcs,·ating the sovereignty of the nation in the field;
fighting, not for Abraham Lincoln, or for any other man, fighting, not
to destroy their own goyernment and their own liberties, but fighting
only to crush out this rebellion, for the Constitution and the Union,
for their own liberties, as well us ours. In an army such as this we
have all the safety that a rebellion, such as this, admits of.
In conclusion, therefore, the Constitution is sufficient for any emergency of national danger. It inwsts the government with ample
power to preserve and perpetuate iti;elf, without impairing the rights,
or endanqering the liberiie.-; of the proplc. Let nil the people of the
2

loyal states imstain and defend it, in the only way in which it can
possibly be sustained and defended in such a time as this; i. e., by
aiding and encouraging, sustaining and supporting, the lawful agentf,
of the government, in striking down its confessed enemies. Then we
shall have no arbitrary arrests in loyal states; then this rebellion will
!<peedily totter to its fall; then this Union will be established as upon
the rock of ages; then we may defy the machinations of all the dc6potic powers of tbe Old World to impede our progress, or to cripple
our power ; then our tree of liberty will take a deeper root, and send
its branches upward and outward until they encircle the whole c::irth.
IIYDE PARK, PA.,

June, 1863.

